A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam, Vol. I: The Enemy (BDM)

A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam, Vol. I: The Enemy (BDM) Released through The Black Vault, a digital archive of declassified documents. The document is available at theblackvault.com/documentarchive/vietnam-intelligence-lessons-learned/ and can be accessed in its entirety at documents.theblackvault.com/documents/vietnam/ADA096424.pdf. This is the first volume of an eight-volume study by the BDM Corporation for the U.S. Army, analyzing strategic lessons of the Vietnam War. Volume I focuses on the enemy, covering 670 pages. The document begins with a letter from the Department of the Army, US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, dated March 9, 1981. The letter is addressed to Ms. Betty Weatherholtz, Defense Technical Information Center, and discusses the declassification of the BDM study. The letter states that the study, assigned AD numbers B048632L through 641L, contained classified information and was secured by the Army War College Security Office in December 1980. BDM has revised the study to delete all classified information and has conformed to clearance review requirements. A revised copy of the study, unclassified and approved for public release, is enclosed with the letter. DTIC Form 50s are also included for assignment of new AD numbers. The BDM Corporation's study, dated November 30, 1979, is titled "A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam." The study is a final draft submitted to DAMO-SSP in accordance with Contract No. DAAW39-78-C-0120. The study's foreword explains that the task is to identify and analyze lessons that should be learned from two decades of direct US involvement in the affairs of South Vietnam. The study is divided into eight volumes, each focusing on a different aspect of the war. Volume I, The Enemy, examines the goals, characteristics, and organization of the Communist Vietnamese. The study aims to define the nature of the enemy the United States was facing and to analyze aspects of the communists' conduct of the war. The study's preface provides context for the analysis, noting that the US Army has carried the heaviest burden during the struggle in Southeast Asia. The study aims to provide an introspective and objective analysis of the major decisions taken and the results that ensued during the war. The study's perspective is guided by the remarks of MG DeWitt C. Smith, Jr., who noted that the US Army won practically all the battles but lost the war in a strategic or political sense. The study aims to provide insights that can be applied to future civilian and military leaders, focusing on broad and general lessons that can be learned from the war. This is what the public record looks like at its most ordinary. The BDM study on the Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam is available at storyflo.com and documents.theblackvault.com/documents/vietnam/ADA096424.pdf.