DoD Inspector General report DODIG-2020-126 (redacted v2)

DoD Inspector General report DODIG-2020-126, released on January 1, 2020, through The Black Vault. This report is a redacted version, version 2, and can be found at https://documents2.theblackvault.com/documents/dod/DODIG-2020-126_REDACTEDV2.PDF. The report was released through the Freedom of Information Act, with no FOIA case number provided. The document contains information that may be exempt from mandatory disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. Inspector General U.S. Department of Defense Report No. DODIG-2020-126, FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY, September 4, 2020. Evaluation of the Air Force's Certification of Space Launch Vehicles. The objective of this evaluation was to determine whether Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center officials complied with the Air Force Launch Services New Entrant Certification Guide when certifying the launch system designs for the National Security Space Launch-class SpaceX Falcon family of launch vehicles. Additionally, during the evaluation, we expanded the objective to also determine whether SMC officials applied the design validation approach in the NECG to three other space launch providers' new entrant launch vehicles that were in development: Northrop Grumman Innovation Systems, United Launch Alliance, and Blue Origin, LLC. The NECG is a technical guide that provides a risk-based approach that the SMC uses to certify the capabilities of prospective new entrant launch service providers, as well as new launch vehicle configurations proposed by existing launch services providers, to launch safe and reliable national security space missions. SMC officials generally complied with the Air Force's Launch Services NECG and its implementing instruction, SMC Operating Instruction 17-001, when certifying the capabilities of SpaceX and its Falcon family of launch vehicles. Additionally, in preparation for future launch vehicle contract competitions, SMC officials generally complied with the NECG to accomplish the design validation assessments of the three other potential launch vehicle providers' new entrant launch vehicles that were still in development. However, the SMC officials identified two areas where they could improve their oversight of future, potential launch vehicle providers and their assessment of launch vehicles with reused components. First, limiting the time to conduct independent verification and validation of a provider's launch vehicle could constrain SMC in determining whether a launch vehicle can reliably launch NSSL payloads at acceptable risk. Second, SMC officials did not assess the risk of allowing the use of previously used launch vehicle components on subsequent space launches with SpaceX's Falcon family of launch vehicles. In response to the draft report, the Director provided a copy of an Air Force Space Command Instruction that solidified the conditions upon which the SMC Commander makes a certification decision. We deleted two recommendations made in the draft report after reviewing additional documentation provided by the SMC Director. This is what the public record looks like at its most ordinary. The full report can be found at https://documents2.theblackvault.com/documents/dod/DODIG-2020-126_REDACTEDV2.PDF.