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CIA: From storyflo, this is Declassified.

2026-11-01 · Last updated November 1, 2026
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From storyflo, this is Declassified. S. intelligence on Chinese intentions toward the Korean War. This memorandum, dated October twelfth, nineteen-fifty, provides an assessment of the threat of Chinese Communist intervention. org, sourced from The Black Vault. This document was released under the Freedom of Information Act.

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From storyflo, this is Declassified. Today, we bring you a declassified C-I-A record detailing U.S. intelligence on Chinese intentions toward the Korean War. This memorandum, dated October twelfth, nineteen-fifty, provides an assessment of the threat of Chinese Communist intervention. The full document is available at archive.org, sourced from The Black Vault. This document was released under the Freedom of Information Act. While a specific F-O-I-A case number is not publicly available for this particular record, it was declassified and made public as part of a larger collection of C-I-A files concerning U.S. intelligence on China. The declassification authority for these records typically falls under Executive Order one three five two six, allowing for the systematic review and release of historically significant government documents. We now turn to the document itself, a memorandum for the President, dated October twelfth, nineteen-fifty, from Walter B. Smith, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Quote: In accordance with your instructions, I submit herewith estimates regarding five critical situations in the Far East. The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force participated in the preparation of these estimates and concur in them. The estimates follow in the following order: Enclosure A: Threat of Full Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea. Enclosure B: Threat of Soviet Intervention in Korea. Enclosure C: Threat of Chinese Communist Invasion of Formosa. Enclosure D: Threat of Chinese Communist Invasion of Indochina. Enclosure E: Communist Capabilities and Threat in the Philippines. Enclosure F: General Soviet and Chinese Communist Intentions and Capabilities in the Far East. Inasmuch as the conclusions reached with respect to these particular situations depend in part on the possibility of a Soviet decision to resort to global war, the latest estimate on that subject is also attached as Enclosure G. Unquote. The document continues with Enclosure A, titled “Threat of Full Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea,” dated October twelfth, nineteen-fifty. Quote: I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 1. To estimate the threat of full-scale Chinese Communist intervention in Korea. II. CAPABILITIES 2. The Chinese Communist ground forces, currently lacking requisite air and naval support, are capable of intervening effectively, but not necessarily decisively, in the Korean conflict. III. FACTORS BEARING ON INTENT 3. Indications of Intentions. Despite statements by Chou En-lai, troop movements to Manchuria, and propaganda charges of atrocities and border violations, there are no convincing indications of an actual Chinese Communist intention to resort to full-scale intervention in Korea. 4. Factors favoring intervention by Chinese Communists: a. Intervention, if resulting in defeat of U.N. forces, would: (1) constitute a major gain in prestige for Communist China, confirming it as the premier Asiatic power; (2) constitute a major gain for World Communism with concomitant increase in Communist China’s stature in the Sino-Soviet axis; (3) result in the elimination of the possibility of a common frontier with a Western-type democracy; and (4) permit the retention of sources of Manchurian electric power along the Yalu River. b. Intervention, even if not resulting in a decisive defeat of U.N. forces, would: (1) enable the Chinese Communists to utilize foreign war as an explanation for failure to carry out previously announced economic reforms; (2) be consistent with and furnish strong impetus to anti-Western trends in Asia; and (3) justify maximum Soviet military and/or economic aid to China. c. Intervention, with or without assurance of final victory, might serve the cause of World Communism, particularly the cause of the Soviet Union, in that it would involve the Western bloc in a costly and possibly inconclusive war in the Far East. d. The Communist cause generally and the Sino-Soviet bloc particularly face the prospect of a major set-back in the struggle with the non-Communist world if U.N. forces are permitted to achieve complete victory in Korea. 5. Factors arguing against intervention by Chinese Communists: a. The Chinese Communists undoubtedly fear the consequences of war with the U.S. Their domestic problems are of such magnitude that the regime’s entire domestic program and economy would be jeopardized by the strains and the material damage which would be sustained in war with the U.S. Anti-Communist forces would be encouraged and the regime’s very existence would be endangered. b. Intervention would minimize the possibility of Chinese membership in the U.N. and of a seat on the Security Council. c. Open intervention would be extremely costly unless protected by powerful Soviet air cover and naval support. Such Soviet aid might not be forthcoming because it would constitute Soviet intervention. d. Acceptance of major Soviet aid would make Peiping more dependent on Soviet help and increase Soviet control in Manchuria to a point probably unwelcome to the Chinese Communist. e. If unsuccessful, Chinese intervention would lay Peiping open to Chinese resentment on the grounds that China would be acting as a Soviet catspaw. f. From a military standpoint the most favorable time for intervention in Korea has passed. g. Continued covert aid would offer most of the advantages of overt intervention, while avoiding its risks and disadvantages. Covert aid would enable the Chinese Communists to: (1) Avoid further antagonizing of the U.N. and reduce risk of war with the U.S.; (2) Promote the China-led Asiatic peoples’ "revolutionary struggle," while ostensibly supporting peace; (3) Maintain freedom of action for later choice between abandonment of aid or continuing such covert aid as might be appropriate to Chinese Communist needs in Korea; (4) Satisfy the "aid Korea" demand in Communist circles in China and Asia generally, without risking war with the U.S. IV. PROBABILITY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST ACTION 6. While full-scale Chinese Communist intervention in Korea must be regarded as a continuing possibility, a consideration of all known factors leads to the conclusion that barring a Soviet decision for global war, such action is not probable in nineteen-fifty. During this period, intervention will probably be confined to continued covert assistance to the North Koreans. Unquote. The document then proceeds to Enclosure B, titled “Threat of Soviet Intervention in Korea,” also dated October twelfth, nineteen-fifty. Quote: I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 1. To estimate the threat of direct Soviet air or land intervention in Korea during nineteen-fifty. II. CAPABILITIES 2. Soviet armed forces now in the Far East are capable of intervening overwhelmingly in Korea virtually without warning. III. FACTORS BEARING ON INTENT 3. Indications of Intentions. The Soviet Union to date has given no indication that it intends to intervene directly in Korea. Since the beginning of hostilities the Soviet Union has sought in its official statements and in its propaganda to give the impression that it is not involved in the Korean situation. Moreover, the U.S.S.R. has taken no political or military actions that constitute direct armed intervention in Korea. However, the Soviet Government for some months has been increasingly improving its military capabilities in the Far East as well as in other strategic areas. 4. Factors favoring Soviet intervention. The defeat of North Korea would constitute a major set-back for the U.S.S.R. It would involve: a. The loss of a Satellite, and the establishment of a Western-oriented state on the frontiers of Communist China and the U.S.S.R. b. Giving the Western Powers a potential strategic bridgehead which the Kremlin would always regard as a threat to the industrial, communication, and military centers of Manchuria and the Soviet Far East. c. Weakening the Soviet military and political position vis-à-vis Japan. d. A loss to Soviet political prestige in that it would demonstrate that the Kremlin is not willing to support its followers effectively in a Soviet-instigated action. e. A loss to Soviet military prestige in that it would lead to a tendency, whether or not justified, to re-evaluate the effectiveness of Soviet military equipment and tactics. f. A reduction in the prospects of the Soviet Union for expanding its political control by means short of war in that it would demonstrate the determination and capability of the non-Soviet world to resist effectively Soviet-inspired aggression. g. In weighing potential gains and risks... Unquote. The document continues with further analysis. This memorandum reflects the intelligence community's assessment during a critical period of the Korean War, preceding the large-scale Chinese intervention that began later in October nineteen-fifty. The assessments highlight the factors considered by U.S. intelligence analysts in real-time, focusing on capabilities, intentions, and the geopolitical implications of various actions. This is what the public record looks like at its most ordinary. Find this document and more at storyflo.com, or directly at archive.org/download/us-china-intel-CI00516/CI00516_djvu.txt.

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From storyflo, this is Declassified. S. intelligence on Chinese intentions toward the Korean War. This memorandum, dated October twelfth, nineteen-fifty, provides an assessment of the threat of Chinese Communist intervention. org, sourced from The Black Vault. This document was released under the Freedom of Information Act.