CIA: From Storyflo, this is Declassified.

From Storyflo, this is Declassified. This is a declassified Central Intelligence Agency record, a China Situation Survey from June nineteen-fifty-one, providing an intelligence appraisal from the standpoint of intelligence procurement and policy planning needs. It discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese Communist regime, its potential for a split with Moscow, and the feasibility of supporting dissident groups or a Third Force. This document is available at documents2.theblackvault.com. This document, originally classified Top Secret, was declassified by the C-I-A and released to the public through The Black Vault's efforts, with the full text available on archive.org. Its declassification authority and specific F-O-I-A case number are not cited within the archive entry. The document begins: "China Situation Survey, June twenty-second, nineteen-fifty-one. From the Standpoint of Intelligence Procurement and Policy Planning Needs. Submitted by J.B. Chase. The survey I attempted to make on my recent visit to Hong Kong, at the direction of Mr. Marshall of S/P, was directed primarily towards: one, ascertaining, on the basis of the best available sources, the salient points that seemed to stand out impressively as pretty well established on the basis of general agreement. Two, noting areas where disagreement or lack of information obscures the delineation of what would seem to be key facts gleaned from the standpoint of policy planning. Three, trying to see, in consultation with our Hong Kong Consulate General, what might be done toward improving intelligence channels to fill in these gaps in the picture, and what their existence meanwhile would seem to imply for the needs of policy planning." "I tried to focus my inquiries especially on the strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese Communist regime, on the potentialities of its splitting with Moscow, on the potentialities for the winning over of forces, dissident Communist groups as well as popular elements, to assist in its overthrow, and on the bearing which use of the Nationalists and development of a 'Third Force' would have on the exploiting of such potentialities. The Chinese interrogated, about twenty persons, were selected with the help of the Consulate General and other competent advisers, an effort being made to get good sources on mainland events and thinking. See Appendix A for list of the more important Chinese interviewed. They included no known Communist party members, Kuomintang representatives, or unqualified supporters of the Nationalist government. They can be roughly divided into the following categories of 'independents' which are believed to reflect fairly well the main politically alert groupings at Hong Kong other than K-M-T and Communist supporters: One, 'Independents', occupationally tied to the Peiping regime, anti-Stalinist, favoring reform but not collapse of the regime. One interviewed. Two, Liberal-Progressives of semi-K-M-T background, strongly anti-Communist, who have had little respect for the Nationalists, but who see no hope or 'percentage' in playing for Communist splits and defection, and who, discounting Third Force potentialities, feel that the only course is full support, though with insistence on reform, of the Nationalist government, at least as a stop-gap rallying force until real leadership emerges. Six interviewed. Three, 'Independents', who strongly oppose the Peiping regime for its police state ruthlessness and servitude to Moscow; who oppose backing the Nationalists for restoration as the overall political authority on the grounds that they would be rejected by mainland China; who would use the Nationalists militarily and as a participating group; who see the need for some Third or new forces, and who envisage revolting Communists as playing an inevitable and indispensable part in overthrowing Peiping's rule and building a new regime. Twelve interviewed, comprising active 'Third Force' Leaders, defected Communist from the Peiping regime, businessmen who tried and left Communist China, and liberal intellectuals with recent experience under the Communists. The list (Appendix A) of the more important sources interviewed also includes six exceptionally informed non-Chinese, four Americans, one Frenchman, and a senior employee of the Consulate General. Information and views of Consul General McConaughy and American officers of his staff were obtained as valuable background but have been excluded as specific supporting material in order to keep myself within the frame of my attempted survey and minimize tendencies for the survey to become a mere reflection and fragmentary version of the Consulate General's much more thorough reporting. The records of the more important interviews together with biographic data, are attached to Appendix A. I should like to utilize the occasion to express very warm appreciation of the live, effective cooperation and the invaluable advice and help which, under the leadership of Consul General, was given by the concerned members of his staff. There follows the statement of the main conclusions and suggestions developed from the survey." "Top Secret. A. Area of Agreement. Salient Points. There are, as yet, no signs of a split between Moscow and Peiping or independence of the U-S-S-R through the initiative of Communist elements themselves. Some C-C-P leaders opposed exclusive alignment with Moscow and intervention in Korea, but the decisions, once made, have received monolithic support in implementation. The Stalinist faction has gained firm control, facilitated by a power centralizing achieved through the Korean war; and Mao himself, whom most picture as still 'boss', though less actively so, and favoring moderation, is in no position to repudiate it. Solidarity has been strengthened by a common fear that the U-S means to destroy Communist China. However, war losses and internal economic and policing strains building up from Korea, together with mounting American might and growing dislike of Soviet intrusion and 'bossing' are undoubtedly increasing anti-Stalinist discontent and pressures toward a split in the Party, which would probably be brought to a head by a general war, assuming, presumably, that Soviet superiority were not quickly established. Some sources even surmised that Peiping's willingness thus far to take punishment as Moscow's 'whipping boy' has been attributable to a Soviet assurance that the U-S-S-R would 'take over' the war on a world basis at a specified future date. There seemed general agreement that things would have to become much worse for Peiping than they are now before any real split and Titoist move would be likely; that meanwhile further U-N military blows in Korea, economic sanctions and exploitation of Soviet unpopularity, Peiping's 'Achilles' heel', are needed as most useful 'softening up' measures to hasten events." This is what the public record looks like at its most ordinary. Find more at storyflo.com. That's storyflo.com. The full document is available at archive.org/download/us-china-intel-CI00762/CI00762_djvu.txt.