CIA: Today, we're examining a declassified C-I-A record detailing Chinese Communist

This is Declassified. Today, we're examining a declassified C-I-A record detailing Chinese Communist capabilities and intentions with respect to Taiwan through nineteen-fifty-two. This document is available at documents2.theblackvault.com. This fourteen-page document, designated a National Intelligence Estimate, N-I-E-27.1, was produced by the Central Intelligence Agency and declassified in full on April first, nineteen-fifty-two, under the authority of the Automatic Declassification Program of the National Archives. No F-O-I-A case number is associated with its release. The document opens, "National Intelligence Estimate. Chinese Communist Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to Taiwan Through Nineteen-Fifty-Two. The problem: To estimate Chinese Communist capabilities and intentions with respect to Taiwan through nineteen-fifty-two. Assumption: The U-S-S-R will continue to support Communist operations in the Far East but will not intervene directly and overtly. One. Except for a substantial increase in air capabilities, the overall capabilities of the Chinese Communists to launch either a large-scale invasion or limited attacks against Taiwan remain substantially unchanged since April nineteen-fifty-one, when N-I-E-27 was published. Chinese Nationalist capabilities to defend Taiwan have not improved substantially since that date. Two. Provided that present U-S policy with respect to Taiwan continues unchanged, and provided that U-S naval and air forces are available to defend Taiwan, Chinese Communist attacks would almost certainly fail. A. We do not believe that, under present circumstances, the Communists could achieve surprise in a large-scale attack. A large-scale Communist invasion attempt would almost certainly fail unless surprise were achieved in such measure as to permit a fait accompli before U-S air and naval forces could be brought to bear. B. A Communist attack with a limited number of their best troops probably could achieve surprise, but the Nationalist forces alone could almost certainly contain such an attack, unless the Communists received timely large-scale reinforcements. U-S naval and air forces could almost certainly prevent such reinforcements. Three. If U-S policy with respect to Taiwan should change and the U-S did not participate in the defense of Taiwan, [four lines redacted under exemption B1] Four. The Nationalist Government is relatively stable and serious factional strife is improbable so long as President Chiang is in effective control. In the event of the overthrow or death of Chiang, factional strife would be intensified and a period of instability would probably follow before another Nationalist leader could establish his authority. Five. The weight of military, propaganda, and other indications suggests that the Chinese Communists intend eventually to launch an attack against Taiwan. Six. Irrespective of developments in Korea, we believe that the Chinese Communists will not make either a limited surprise attack or a large-scale attack against Taiwan during the period of this estimate, provided that present U-S policy with respect to Taiwan continues. Seven. During the period of this estimate, the Communists will probably conduct reconnaissance, nuisance, or destruction raids (either by air or sea) against Nationalist-held offshore islands and may assault and capture some of these islands. However, we do not believe such actions will necessarily indicate an imminent invasion of Taiwan. Eight. Over the longer term, we believe that the Chinese Communists will attempt to secure control over Taiwan by diplomatic means if possible; otherwise by military action when a favorable opportunity presents itself. So long as the military strength of the United States and the Communists in the Far East remains substantially unchanged, and so long as U-S policy with respect to Taiwan continues unchanged, we believe the Chinese Communists will not launch a military attack on Taiwan. The Chinese Communist Situation. The Chinese Communist Army. Nine. Since April nineteen-fifty-one, when N-I-E-27 was published, there has been no significant change in the estimated strength and effectiveness of Chinese Communist troops in position for an attack against Taiwan. Approximately two hundred and forty-thousand troops are estimated to be based on the mainland east coast (in Chekiang, Fukien, and Eastern Kwangtung Provinces). In addition, approximately one hundred and thirty-thousand troops which are deployed in the Canton and Shanghai areas could be utilized for operations against Taiwan. (See Map.) This total force of three hundred and seventy-thousand includes one artillery division and several thousand other specialized troops. Except for some inferiority in weapons and equipment, and in the scale of effectiveness, it is estimated to be approximately equal to that of Chinese Communist troops in Korea. Reports of unknown reliability indicate that at least twenty-five-thousand Chinese Communist troops have received some airborne training in North China and Manchuria. There have also been claims that Chinese Communist troops have been receiving amphibious training, but we do not believe that this type of training has been conducted on a large scale. Ten. In the event of a resumption of full-scale hostilities in Korea, the forces discussed above would probably still be available for operations against Taiwan. Eleven. In case of an armistice in Korea, up to two hundred and fifty-thousand troops not required for Korean operations could be redeployed to the mainland invasion coast for operations against Taiwan. The Chinese Communist Air Force. Twelve. The overall capability of the Chinese Communist Air Force (C-C-A-F) to support operations against Taiwan has increased substantially since the publication of N-I-E-27 and the C-C-A-F is now a formidable military force. The total aircraft strength of the C-C-A-F in operational units has increased from five hundred and fifty to one thousand seven hundred between April nineteen-fifty-one and February nineteen-fifty-two. Jet fighter strength in the C-C-A-F has increased from two hundred to six hundred during this period. C-C-A-F sortie capabilities have increased significantly. (See Annex A.) Thirteen. The major part of the C-C-A-F is based in Manchuria and North China. There are, however, elements of the C-C-A-F based south of the Yangtze: an estimated twenty jet fighters at Canton, ten jet fighters at Hankow, twenty jet fighters and forty piston fighters at Shanghai, and forty piston light bombers at Nanking. (See Map.) Even in the event of major redeployment to bases south of the Yangtze, the C-C-A-F could not launch a full-scale offensive against Taiwan. Substantial airfield build-up would precede or accompany such redeployment and would be difficult to conceal. Fourteen. In addition to those aircraft already based south of the Yangtze, the Communists could, without appreciable effect on their present scale of air operations in Korea, make available for an attack on Taiwan one hundred and twenty piston fighters, one hundred and twenty ground attack bombers, one hundred and eighty light bombers, and a substantial portion of the one hundred and fifty available transports. Fifteen. During the past several months, the Communists have constructed six new airfields in Communist China within a three hundred and fifty mile radius of Taiwan. Six of these are within jet fighter operational radius of Taiwan. Sixteen. In the event of extended U-N air attacks against targets in China proper and/or Manchuria, it is probable that the Communist capability for air operations against Taiwan would vary adversely with the intensity and duration of the U-N operation. Seventeen. In the event of an armistice in Korea, a substantial part of the aircraft available to the Communists in Korea could be redeployed for operations against Taiwan, but the essential preparations for full-scale operations would be difficult and would take time. The Chinese Communist Navy. Eighteen. The capabilities of the Chinese Communist Navy to support amphibious operations against Taiwan would be limited to the following: A. Minelaying and limited minesweeping operations in the waters concerned. B. Reconnaissance, including the use of small craft. C. Amphibious operations against Nationalist-held islands off the China coast. D. Surprise Motor Torpedo Boat (M-T-B) attacks and possibly patrol boat attacks on U-S or Nationalist naval forces. E. Limited anti-submarine escort for merchant shipping. F. Patrol of Chinese coastal waters, employing both conventional naval vessels and motor junks converted to naval use. G. Possible limited use of submarines. Nineteen. Chinese Communist naval capabilities would not be significantly affected by either a resumption of full-scale hostilities or an armistice in Korea. This is what the public record looks like at its most ordinary. storyflo.com. That's storyflo.com, and the full document is available at archive.org/download/us-china-intel-CI00900/CI00900_djvu.txt.