Today, we examine a Central Intelligence Agency National Intelligence Estimate

This is Declassified. Today, we examine a Central Intelligence Agency National Intelligence Estimate on Communist China, through nineteen-sixty-one, published on March nineteenth, nineteen-fifty-seven. This document offers a window into how the United States intelligence community viewed China during a pivotal Cold War era. You can find this declassified record at documents2.theblackvault.com. This document, identified as National Intelligence Estimate, N I E, thirteen-fifty-seven, was approved for release by the Central Intelligence Agency, C I A, and first made publicly available on January first, two-thousand-fourteen. It reflects the collaborative assessment of multiple U.S. intelligence organizations, including the C I A, and the intelligence departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Its declassification was authorized under exemption one point four D. The document begins: "Approved for Release, N I E thirteen-fifty-seven, nineteen March nineteen-fifty-seven, National Intelligence Estimate, Number thirteen-fifty-seven, Supersedes N I E thirteen-fifty-six, Communist China Through nineteen-sixty-one. Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff. All members of the United States Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on nineteen March nineteen-fifty-seven. Concurring were the Special Assistant for Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, U S A F; and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the U S I B, and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction. This estimate was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy is for the information and use of the recipient indicated on the front cover and of persons under his jurisdiction on a need to know basis. Additional essential dissemination may be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments: A. Special Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence, for the Department of State. B. Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, for the Department of the Army. C. Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy. D. Director of Intelligence, U S A F, for the Department of the Air Force. E. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff. F. Director of Intelligence, A E C, for the Atomic Energy Commission. G. Assistant Director, F B I, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation. H. Assistant Director for Central Reference, C I A, for any other Department or Agency. This estimate may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by arrangement with the Office of Central Reference, C I A. When an estimate is disseminated to an organization outside the Department of Defense or the Federal Bureau of Investigation, it is for a period not in excess of one year. At its expiration it must either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or a request submitted to the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with paragraph two above. The problem: To examine the present situation in Communist China and its international relations, and to estimate probable developments during the next five years. One. The Chinese Communist Party will almost certainly maintain firm control over mainland China. Through a combination of incentives and repression the regime will probably be able to prevent popular discontent from becoming a significant factor in retarding the momentum of its program. Two. The Chinese Communists will probably continue to make substantial progress in industrial development but agricultural production will probably increase at only fifty percent of the planned rate of increase and thus will tend to restrict the rate of overall economic growth. Three. Communist China has placed great emphasis upon maintaining and developing its armed forces as a basic aspect of national power. With Soviet assistance, its military capabilities have become far greater than those of any other Asian power and will probably continue to increase during the next five years. Four. Peiping’s influence in the Communist world has been greatly enhanced as a result of developments since the death of Stalin and particularly because of the prominent role they have played in Bloc affairs in the past year. Peiping will probably further increase its influence within the Communist Bloc and will have an important voice in matters affecting the Bloc as a whole. Communist China will continue to rely on the S O V I E T Bloc for the bulk of its modern armaments and advanced industrial equipment. Despite the existence of differences and conflicts between Moscow and Peiping, it is highly unlikely that either will permit such conflicts to impair Sino-Soviet solidarity. Five. Communist China’s influence has increased markedly in the non-Communist world, and its presence is especially felt in Asia. The Chinese Communists have been able to create the impression in much of non-Communist Asia that Communist China is a dynamic, permanent, and perhaps not-unfriendly world power, which it is unwise to offend by too close alignment with the West. At the same time, however, there is apprehension concerning Communist China’s real intentions and a recognition, though seldom voiced publicly, of the importance of the U S in restraining Communist China from overt aggression. Six. The replacement of Western influence by Communist influence in Asia will continue to be a major Chinese Communist objective. In its approach to this objective and other international problems, Peiping will probably try to avoid courses of action which it believes would provoke U S military intervention. It will remain hostile to the U S, and will not offer major concessions on basic issues. Nevertheless, it will probably endeavor to appear conciliatory and flexible on international issues. At the same time, it will continue its subversive efforts, and will take advantage of opportunities for Communist expansion, possibly including revolt against non-Communist governments. Peiping will remain determined to obtain control of Taiwan, but will almost certainly not attempt to seize Taiwan by force so long as the U S is committed to its defense." The Central Intelligence Agency, in its published historical review of this period, notes that N I E's like this one were designed to provide the President and senior policymakers with authoritative intelligence assessments on key global issues. These estimates represent the consensus view of the intelligence community at the time of their publication, offering a baseline for policy formulation. This is what the public record looks like at its most ordinary. storyflo.com. The full document is available at archive.org/download/us-china-intel-CI01268/CI01268_djvu.txt.