What did the declassified documents reveal?

From vault.fbi.gov, this is an internal communication from March tenth, nineteen-fifty-two, regarding United States Intelligence on China, specifically the Far East Air Forces Electronic Intelligence Program. It's notable for its frank assessment of the program's shortcomings during the Korean War. This document was released to the public through the efforts of The Black Vault, accessible at documents2.theblackvault.com, with the canonical PDF available at archive.org. This particular record is designated under the Black Vault entry 'US Intelligence on China CI00885'. It was declassified by an unspecified authority. The document is a three-page letter, marked Top Secret, from Lieutenant General O. G. Weyland, Commanding General of Far East Air Forces, to Lieutenant General Thomas D. White, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, United States Air Force. Dated March tenth, nineteen-fifty-two, it opens: Dear Tommy, I have your letter of twenty-seventh February. I appreciate your expression of interest in our electronic intercept problems and your offer of assistance. I feel that our entire Electronic intercept program is unrealistic and dangerously "dated." To illustrate, permit me to outline our program here in the Far East. Our task is twofold. First, we must maintain electronic surveillance of the entire Far East Coastal area from the Arctic Ocean to Hainan Island in accordance with radio AFOOP-C TS-1431 of seventeenth May nineteen-fifty. Upon receipt of the additional R-B-fifty ferret aircraft, we will more nearly approach a capability of satisfactorily accomplishing this task. I appreciate the delay which was occasioned by the necessity for procurement of equipment and the training of crews. At present we are also having considerable difficulty in getting full utilization. The aircraft are A-O-C-P for an excessive amount of time, hence we are getting a very low sortie rate. I'm presenting these factors merely to point out that while I'm thankful for these three additional aircraft, we cannot relax and feel that the program has been properly implemented until we can get better equipment and can achieve a higher utilization of same. Secondly, we must accurately locate and determine employment of the enemy's radar facilities in Korea in support of the war effort. In this regard, we are woefully weak. The R-B-fifties will definitely increase our capability for general search. However, the equipment installed in these aircraft was designed in the early forties and cannot satisfactorily cope with all of the transmissions emitted by the radar presently being employed by the enemy. The equipment is particularly ill-adapted in its recording features and in its provisions for obtaining accurate direction-finding (D/F) fixes. The latter became painfully obvious when we attempted to pinpoint enemy radar stations in Korea so that Hank Everest could go to work on them. We must face the fact that we do not have the capability of providing tactical units with…

Why was this case declassified?

This material entered the public record through the U.S. declassification and Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) process. The originating source document is linked on this page so the citation chain is auditable.

CIA From Vault.fbi.gov, This Is An Internal Communication From March Tenth

◆ BLUF — The short version

gov, this is an internal communication from March tenth, nineteen-fifty-two, regarding United States Intelligence on China, specifically the Far East Air Forces Electronic Intelligence Program. It's notable for its frank assessment of the program's shortcomings during the Korean War. org.

Date: OCT 13 · 2026
Release: Declassified · U.S. public record (FOIA)
Source document: View the primary source document

↯ Dispatch — press play1:00

0:001:00

↯ Share

X in r/

Episode notes

From vault.fbi.gov, this is an internal communication from March tenth, nineteen-fifty-two, regarding United States Intelligence on China, specifically the Far East Air Forces Electronic Intelligence Program. It's notable for its frank assessment of the program's shortcomings during the Korean War…

View the primary source document

Questions about this case

What was CIA From Vault.fbi.gov, This Is An Internal Communication From March Tenth about?: gov, this is an internal communication from March tenth, nineteen-fifty-two, regarding United States Intelligence on China, specifically the Far East Air Forces Electronic Intelligence Program. It's notable for its frank assessment of the program's shortcomings during the Korean War. org.
Why was this case declassified?: This material entered the public record through the U.S. declassification and Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) process. Storyflo narrates it directly from the public release.

intelligence-vault

Related cases

✉ Dispatches

A short dispatch when a new file is released — narrated, answer-first, and linked straight to the primary source. No spam; unsubscribe anytime.

↯ Subscribe to the feed

RSS feed Browse all cases

CIA From Vault.fbi.gov, This Is An Internal Communication From March Tenth

Questions about this case

Related cases

Today, A Declassified Central Intelligence Agency Record, Dated February

CIA "di/usaf Contribution To Nie 27

CIA Today, A Declassified C I A Record On Clandestine Intelligence Collection

Today, We Examine A Declassified Government Record Concerning United States

Today, A Declassified Central Intelligence Agency Record From March Seventh

Questions about this case

Related cases

Today, A Declassified Central Intelligence Agency Record, Dated February

CIA "di/usaf Contribution To Nie 27

CIA Today, A Declassified C I A Record On Clandestine Intelligence Collection

Today, We Examine A Declassified Government Record Concerning United States

Today, A Declassified Central Intelligence Agency Record From March Seventh

Get the next declassified case in your inbox