What did the declassified documents reveal?

This Declassified briefing covers a February tenth, nineteen-fifty-three, top-secret memorandum from the United States Air Force Directorate of Intelligence, discussing China’s possible courses of action during the Korean War. This document offers insights into the strategic thinking of the era. The record is accessible via The Black Vault at documents2.theblackvault.com. This document was declassified by the United States Air Force, as part of a release of intelligence records pertaining to China, with no specific FOIA case number provided. It was made publicly available by The Black Vault in partnership with the Internet Archive. The document reads: TOP SECRET 10 February 1953 MEMORANDUM FOR: LT. GENERAL WHITE I believe F-E-C-O-M's message asking for freedom to attack Manchurian Air bases was necessary for him to send even if only for the record. I feel however that his message does not completely cover the difficulty of the U-N Command with respect to the Communist air threat. The numerical measures given to aircraft and types are of the same order of magnitude as we provide in Air Force Headquarters. Some differences exist due to F-E-A-F's method of computing which is to make a measurement of strength in the field rather than T/O strength. However, these differences are not influential. The possible communist courses of action described by F-E-C-O-M are believed accurate judgments as far as they go. However, he does not discuss the following courses of action which we believe to be equally valid judgments: 1. Creation of sufficient strength in the C-C-A-F to deter the extension of U-N air action through threat of retaliation. 2. Creation and deployment of sufficient strength in the C-C-A-F to force unilateral U-S extension of action against Communist China, thereby involving the U-S unilaterally with China and separating us from our allies. 3. Employing a competent Chinese Air Force including bombardment types against the same kind of targets in South Korea as the U-N has been attacking in North Korea since the beginning of the Korean campaigns, meanwhile keeping the ground situation static. The latter would seem to be a preferred course because it would: a. Permit use of Chinese Air Forces in strengths that can be produced at an early date. b. Could be described for propaganda purposes in a very appealing light, i.e., it could be proven that the Communists were not extending the conflict, only conforming to U-S practices that had been pursued even throughout the truce talks. c. Could be used as very definite pressure for the resumption of truce talks on Communist terms. d. If desired, could be converted without great delay into enough pressure to force U-S unilateral action contrary to the judgment of our allies. There are few Communist disadvantages to any of these courses of action. I believe they would like the U-S to become deeply and unilaterally involved with Communist China at a time of their choosing. They have almost a perfect set…

Why was this case declassified?

This material entered the public record through the U.S. declassification and Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) process. The originating source document is linked on this page so the citation chain is auditable.

This Declassified Briefing Covers A February Tenth, Nineteen Fifty Three

◆ BLUF — The short version

This Declassified briefing covers a February tenth, nineteen-fifty-three, top-secret memorandum from the United States Air Force Directorate of Intelligence, discussing China’s possible courses of action during the Korean War. This document offers insights into the strategic thinking of the era.

Date: OCT 8 · 2026
Release: Declassified · U.S. public record (FOIA)
Source document: View the primary source document

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What was This Declassified Briefing Covers A February Tenth, Nineteen Fifty Three about?: This Declassified briefing covers a February tenth, nineteen-fifty-three, top-secret memorandum from the United States Air Force Directorate of Intelligence, discussing China’s possible courses of action during the Korean War. This document offers insights into the strategic thinking of the era.
Why was this case declassified?: This material entered the public record through the U.S. declassification and Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) process. Storyflo narrates it directly from the public release.

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This Declassified Briefing Covers A February Tenth, Nineteen Fifty Three

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