What did the declassified documents reveal?

This is a declassified United States intelligence cable concerning China’s nuclear program, dated June fourteenth, nineteen sixty‑five. The cable was transmitted by the Department of State to the U.S. Embassy in Paris and is notable because it provides contemporaneous U.S. assessment of China’s second nuclear test and its emerging delivery capabilities. The source is the public‑domain collection hosted at The Black Vault. The document was released to the public through The Black Vault’s online archive. The digitized copy was uploaded as part of a broader declassification effort by the originating agency, the Department of State, under standard classification review. No specific Freedom of Information Act case number is cited in the archive entry, and the release date is recorded as the date the file was made available on the archive website. The cable reads as follows: ACTION: U.S. Embassy Paris, PRIORITY TOP SECRET. Reference: POLAD 1785. Guidance for oral statement on the second nuclear explosion in China. Guidance refers to numbered paragraphs in POLAD document sixty‑five, paragraph three. Paragraph three, subsection a: Test mode—whether an airdrop or a tower shot—remains uncertain, but the most likely method was an airdrop. Consequently, at least nominal military capability must be ascribed to the Chinese, although the aircraft delivery systems available to them are obsolete. They consist of very few B‑29‑type bombers and a couple of medium jet bombers. The Chinese have a fair number of I‑L‑28 light jet bombers, but because of dimension and weight limitations on the I‑L‑28, it is doubtful they could have been used as drop aircraft for the second test. From a scientific point of view, the second test, with a yield more than twice that of the first, clearly indicates an advanced Chinese nuclear weapons program. The United States cannot say, however, by how much. The fact that enriched uranium‑235 was again used as the fissionable material leaves unclear whether plutonium is available in any quantity. If plutonium is available, that would have a limiting effect on Chinese weapons development, particularly in their efforts to develop smaller, lighter devices. [redacted] Paragraph three, subsection b: Chinese fissionable‑material production will be a major factor in determining both the time when they can develop an effective nuclear armory and the ultimate size of their stockpile. If fissionable‑material production is adequate to support a vigorous test program—and we assess that it is—problems of size and weight can be solved in a fairly straightforward way. Beyond that, however, it is impossible to say what Chinese goals are in terms of stockpile and whether they are now in a position to meet those goals. In part, this will depend on their success in developing delivery systems, particularly missiles. It would be prudent to assume, however, that they will be able to develop compatible warheads and that fissionable material will be available…

Why was this case declassified?

This material entered the public record through the U.S. declassification and Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) process. The originating source document is linked on this page so the citation chain is auditable.

United States Intelligence Cable Concerning China’s Nuclear Program, Dated June

◆ BLUF — The short version

This is a declassified United States intelligence cable concerning China’s nuclear program, dated June fourteenth, nineteen sixty‑five. S. S. assessment of China’s second nuclear test and its emerging delivery capabilities. The source is the public‑domain collection hosted at The Black Vault.

Date: AUG 20 · 2026
Release: Declassified · U.S. public record (FOIA)
Source document: View the primary source document

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This is a declassified United States intelligence cable concerning China’s nuclear program, dated June fourteenth, nineteen sixty‑five. The cable was transmitted by the Department of State to the U.S. Embassy in Paris and is notable because it provides contemporaneous U.S. assessment of China’s…

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What was United States Intelligence Cable Concerning China’s Nuclear Program, Dated June about?: This is a declassified United States intelligence cable concerning China’s nuclear program, dated June fourteenth, nineteen sixty‑five. S. S. assessment of China’s second nuclear test and its emerging delivery capabilities. The source is the public‑domain collection hosted at The Black Vault.
Why was this case declassified?: This material entered the public record through the U.S. declassification and Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) process. Storyflo narrates it directly from the public release.

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United States Intelligence Cable Concerning China’s Nuclear Program, Dated June

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