From vault.fbi.gov, this is a declassified Central Intelligence Agency record from April ninth, nineteen-sixty-two, titled The Decline of Mao Tse-tung. This document is notable for its early, speculative assessment of Mao's health and potential political future.
This record was released to the public under the Freedom of Information Act in May two-thousand-seven, with redactions under exemptions E-O twelve-thousand-nine-hundred-fifty-eight, sections three point three B one and three point three B six, and six point two A four. This release was approved by the National Archives and Records Administration, A-A-R-O.
The document opens:
Office of Current Intelligence Central Intelligence. O-C-I number fifteen-oh-six-sixty-two. Copy number four-hundred-ninety-nine. Nine April nineteen-sixty-two. The Decline of Mao Tse-tung. Reference Title: Polo X-V-sixty-two. Current Intelligence Staff Study.
This is a postscript to Polo X-I-V-sixty-one, "The Chinese Communist Leadership, nineteen-fifty-eight-nineteen-sixty-one." It recapitulates the evidence for the probability that Mao Tse-tung has been deteriorating in recent years, and for the possibility that he is suffering from a serious medical disorder which could soon lead to his death or retirement or overthrow. The paper speculates on the implications of this probable deterioration and possible illness for the Chinese Communist party and the Sino-Soviet relationship. An appendix provides a record of information bearing on Mao's health which has come to hand since nineteen-forty-five.
The Sino-Soviet Studies Group would welcome comment on this paper, with respect either to the conclusions or to the record on which the conclusions are based. Comment should be addressed in this instance to the coordinator of the group, [four lines redacted under exemption B one].
Summary: There is good evidence that Mao Tse-tung has been deteriorating in recent years, if only in the sense of declining energies and abilities. Evidence of this kind includes his own statements about weakening powers and his own preparations for possible retirement; his generally unimpressive performances in speeches and interviews; the apparent sharp decline in his productivity; and the failure of the regime to publish anything of Mao's except brief remarks.
There is also some evidence to suggest a specific medical disorder from which Mao might be suffering. Such evidence is consistent with a picture of either cerebral ischemia, insufficient flow of blood to the brain, or senile dementia, senility. The evidence for a serious degree of either disorder, however, is not impressive, and our ability to make a diagnosis on the available evidence is quite limited.
The total evidence, both for deterioration and for a specific disorder, affects to some degree certain conclusions we have previously offered about Chinese Communist party affairs and the Sino-Soviet relationship. While we believe that Mao still dominates the Chinese party, the question seems open for the future. We see a stronger possibility than before, now almost an even chance, that Mao will step aside and become honorary chairman of the party at the next party congress, perhaps this year. We see only a slightly stronger possibility than before that Mao will be pushed out, a weaker possibility, we think now, than the possibility that he will voluntarily step aside. And while we continue to believe that Liu Shao-chi will probably succeed Mao and will probably pursue much the same policies, we think that Mao's decline could give Liu a reason or pretext for changing Mao's policies. Mao's departure, for whatever reason, might well lead to an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations, although probably not to a resolution of the Sino-Soviet dispute.
The document continues with a detailed analysis of Mao's conduct of Chinese party affairs and foreign policy, referencing various "Polo" and "Esau" papers. It details a series of decisions and initiatives from nineteen-fifty-six onward that the C-I-A considered evidence of Mao's deterioration, including the "hundred flowers" experiment, the "great leap forward," the commune program, and the "backyard steel" program. The analysis also covers Mao's challenges to Soviet strategy and Khrushchev personally.
This is what the public record looks like at its most ordinary. For more declassified government documents, visit storyflo.com, and view this document at archive.org/download/us-china-intel-C-I-oh-one-four-six-eight/C-I-oh-one-four-six-eight_djvu.txt
