Declassified.
This is a declassified Central Intelligence Agency memorandum, dated March second, nineteen-sixty-four, concerning a visit by Deputy Director for Intelligence Ray Cline to Taipei, and U.S. relations with the Republic of China. This document is notable for its insights into the morale of the Republic of China government and its assessment of U.S. policy in Asia. It can be found at documents2.theblackvault.com.
This document was approved for release in October two-thousand-and-two, under exemption E. O. one-three-five-five-eight, B. one, one zero, P. two, five, two, C. five, two, eight. It is part of the public record concerning U.S. intelligence on China.
The Director of Central Intelligence. Washington twenty-five, D.C. Second March, nineteen-sixty-four. Memorandum for: The Honorable Dean Rusk, The Secretary of State; The Honorable McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; The Honorable W. Averell Harriman, The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. Attached is a copy of a memorandum from Mr. Cline, Deputy Director for Intelligence, summarizing certain aspects of U.S. relations with the Republic of China. As you will recall, Cline went to Taipei at the request of State Department to endeavor to persuade President Chiang Kai-shek not to act precipitously in breaking relations with France over the recognition issue. Cline’s efforts gained two weeks time and this, in itself, probably influenced a number of countries not to follow de Gaulle's course too precipitously. Since Cline's presence in Taipei was recognized by President Chiang Kai-shek as that of a special emissary of President Johnson, and since Ray observed an abnormally dismal state of morale of the G.R.C. officials, it seems appropriate that a communication should go to President Chiang Kai-shek as promptly as possible, warmly phrased, in the interests of rekindling confidence. Signed: John A. McCone.
Subject: U.S. Relations with Republic of China (Taiwan). One. My trip to Taipei last month succeeded in getting the Government of the Republic of China (G.R.C.) to postpone breaking relations with France for two weeks, thus forcing both Peiping and Paris to make clear that France was obliged to drop its diplomatic support of the G.R.C. in Taiwan as the price of establishing relations with Peiping. This was a gain for the U.S. since many nations would recognize Peiping if they thought they could maintain diplomatic relations with "Two Chinas." Few nations have followed the French lead because it became clear that any nation recognizing Peiping had to go all the way and recognize its right to take over Taiwan and its twelve million anti-Communist people. Two. President Chiang Kai-shek agreed to this delay out of respect for President Johnson's direct request to do so, but pointed out (correctly) that the French had sold out to Peiping and would force a break between Paris and Taipei. He also said this would be a shattering blow to morale in Taiwan, particularly among the Mainland Chinese element in his Armed Forces and Government. Three. President Chiang requested that his views be conveyed to Washington, along with his recommendations for actions to restore morale in Taiwan and build up U.S. prestige in Southeast Asia. I summarized these views in the form of an oral message for President Johnson and provided it to Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary Harriman and McGeorge Bundy about three weeks ago. A copy is attached. Four. This memorandum is intended to call to your attention some information on which I orally briefed Governor Harriman and McGeorge Bundy. It is that (a) I found the morale of G.R.C. officials exceptionally and dismally low; (b) a senior Chinese General had attempted on January twenty-first, nineteen-sixty-four, to lead the crack First Armored Division against Taipei to overthrow the Government (of course, he failed); (c) President Chiang told me personally in highly emotional tones that a continuation of present U.S. policy in Asia, which he feels will end in Chinese Communist control or domination of all East and Southeast Asia, will create a situation in which the G.R.C. cannot survive; (d) many officials in addition to President Chiang felt that present trends would bring a military coup in Taipei against the present Government within two years because of frustration with inability to return to the Mainland and a feeling that U.S. military, economic and political support was weak and waning. Five. In view of the seriousness with which these views were impressed upon me, I feel that they should be seriously considered by the U.S. Government. My own feeling is that a strong U.S. initiative in Vietnam would buck up morale in Taipei, but I think it would be dangerous to assume that we can always take stability and friendly cooperation on the part of the G.R.C. for granted. [Four lines redacted under exemption B one]. Signed: Ray Cline, Deputy Director (Intelligence).
This is what the public record looks like at its most ordinary. Find more at storyflo.com and at archive.org/download/us-china-intel-CI01602/CI01602_djvu.txt.
