Declassified.
Today, we examine a declassified government record on U.S. intelligence regarding President Chiang Kai-shek's intentions toward China, a secret cable from October twentieth, nineteen sixty-four. This document, released via The Black Vault, provides insight into a critical moment in Cold War history following China's first nuclear test.
This document was obtained through public access to government records and is available for public review at documents2.theblackvault.com. It was released as part of a larger collection of U.S. intelligence on China.
The document, a telegram from the Department of State, reads in part:
Telegram Department of State. Correction issued. Secretary of State Washington D.C. From Taipei, October twenty-first, nineteen sixty-four, two fifty-five A.M. Immediate Secret.
Action Immediate Department. Information Hong Kong. From Taipei, October twentieth, six P.M. Departmental Telegram three six nine.
President Chiang did not elaborate on what he had in mind when he referred to the need for a "new solution." Believe he and other senior G.R.C. leaders are groping for a way of sustaining credibility of mainland recovery policy in face of impressive ChiCom feat, possibility of which they had consistently discounted outside time brackets of our own estimates. See Minutes of Conversation with Secretary of State, April sixteenth and our four-three-two-five, page four.
In absence specific evidence as to what President Chiang may have had in mind, we estimate that he probably has in mind devising ways of crippling or destroying ChiCom nuclear production facilities, or repeating proposals for U.S. support for G.R.C. military action against mainland, U.S. participation in Asian anti-Communist alliance, or some other dramatic action probably involving radical stiffening of U.S. policy toward Communist China, aimed at countering psychological effect of ChiCom nuclear explosion.
Chiang Ching-kuo today proposed informally to General Carter that U.S. consider sending high-level team to discuss with G.R.C. political and military implications of C.C.N.E. He did not indicate that G.R.C. has as yet any specific line of action to propose.
We doubt that Ambassador Tsiang is to make specific proposal to Secretary on Wednesday, except for possibly repeating FonMin’s request, Embassy Telegram three two four, that U.S. publicly declare it would meet ChiCom nuclear attack with nuclear response. He more likely to be instructed to present G.R.C. views along lines expressed to me by President and FonMin and seek U.S. views as to what can be done to counter growing ChiCom threat under conditions of prospective nuclear capability. Signed Wright.
Note: Advance copy to S/S-O at seven zero-three A.M., October twentieth. Passed White House at seven fifteen A.M., October twentieth. Reproduction from this copy is prohibited unless unclassified.
This document captures the immediate aftermath of China's first nuclear test and the resulting strategic uncertainty among U.S. allies, highlighting the perceived need for a new approach to counter the psychological and military implications of this development.
This is what the public record looks like at its most ordinary. Find more at storyflo.com and the document's canonical U.R.L. at archive.org/download/us-china-intel-CI01640/CI01640_djvu.txt.
