When I was a pastor, I spent years teaching the Bible. My theological training had taught me to work with the original languages and to notice how much an interpretation sometimes depends on the decision a translator makes about a single word. I valued that discipline and still do. Looking back, I’m struck by how much freedom I felt to reconsider the meaning of a word and how little freedom I felt to reconsider what the Bible as a whole was supposed to say. I expected its writers to give me a coherent account of God. If two voices appeared to disagree, I assumed the problem lay somewhere in my reading. A sufficiently careful interpreter would find the agreement that had to be there.
The experience of accompanying people through religious deconstruction changed the kinds of questions I brought to the text. I heard people describe the relief of no longer believing that every loss was part of a plan. They still had to decide how to live with what had happened. Some left communities they could no longer belong to in good conscience and missed the people who would have known to call on the anniversary of a death. A person might question an entire theology and then find, in the middle of an ordinary decision, how difficult it was to trust a judgment of their own. Leaving had changed the authority of the old answers. The questions were present in the texture of their days.
I recognized those questions from the Bible, though I had spent much of my time with the book trying to settle them. This series begins with a proposal that has grown out of both parts of my life. The Bible is fundamentally an existential book. Its diverse writings preserve the efforts of human beings to understand their relationship to existence itself, including their efforts to give that relationship a divine and religious form. I want to read those efforts closely enough to see where they illuminate human experience, where they conceal something about it, and what they reveal about the sort of creatures who need to make sense of being alive.
By existential, I mean the conditions inseparable from being human and the relationship we develop with those conditions. We come into a world already inhabited, already interpreted, and full of arrangements we had no part in making. Our dependence on others precedes any decision about whom we will trust. As we grow, we discover that people we love will die and that the same is true of us. We become responsible for decisions whose consequences we cannot fully foresee. Even the person with a clear sense of purpose must live through days in which what deserves their attention is genuinely in doubt.
The conditions themselves leave many of our deepest questions open. Mortality gives life a limit and puts pressure on what we do with our time. Its significance varies with whose death we are facing and what we believe we owe the living. The need to belong exposes us to both care and coercion. Freedom is experienced by people with different resources and different amounts of room to act. To speak of the human condition is to name the ground of these questions while remaining attentive to whose life is being described. A person making bricks for Pharaoh encounters freedom from a different place than Pharaoh does.
Calling the Bible existential is a claim about where much of its force comes from. Its writers give human predicaments a form in which they become visible and arguable. A story makes room for a person whose grief exceeds what his friends know how to say. A law gives a people a way of remembering what it meant to live under another’s power. A poem lets someone address God from a place where God seems absent. The experience takes on a shape that others are able to recognize, sometimes across centuries and sometimes at a great distance from the beliefs of the writer.
The Bible also preserves incompatible ways of making a life intelligible. The hope that goodness and well-being belong together has deep appeal. So does the demand, voiced with particular force in Job, that an account of justice make room for what happens to people who have done nothing to earn their suffering. Those voices are more interesting to me when each is allowed its full weight. One expresses a legitimate human desire to live in a world where conduct makes a difference. The other shows what that desire does to our judgment when we mistake it for a guarantee.
The first move in an existential reading is to distinguish what a person or community encounters from the meaning through which they come to live with it. A death occurs and someone understands it as punishment. A people escapes bondage and remembers its freedom as deliverance. In both cases the interpretation enters the life that follows. It changes whom people blame, what they celebrate, and what they teach their children. The encounter and its meaning are intertwined in experience, but they remain open to different kinds of inquiry. The occurrence of a loss is one matter. What that loss tells us about the person who suffered it is another.
In Scripture, even the encounter reaches us through someone’s telling. We hear what a narrator chooses to report, see what a story makes visible, and learn about other people through what it allows them to say. An existential reading therefore requires the habits of close interpretation. It asks what kind of writing we are reading, whose experience organizes it, and where its account comes under pressure. Historical questions help us understand what was at stake for the people who told these stories. Literary questions help us see what a particular telling does. The philosophical question runs through both. What picture of human existence makes sense of the choices this text has made, and where does the experience represented in it exceed that picture?
In Genesis 3, for instance, the humans make coverings and hide. Many readers first meet that scene through a doctrine about the origin of sin. The doctrine has its own history and consequences. Reading existentially, I would slow down at the point where the humans become newly aware of themselves as beings who are exposed and seen. Hiding changes the relationship between them and the one who calls to them. That sequence raises a question that remains alive whether a reader takes the garden as history, myth, or sacred story. How does the discovery that we are vulnerable to another’s judgment affect what we are willing to reveal about ourselves?
There is a reason to take the story’s symbolic form seriously. A story is able to hold several moments of experience together without deciding in advance which one explains the rest. In the garden, the acquisition of knowledge accompanies a loss of ease in the presence of others. That is a more difficult thought than the familiar lesson that disobedience has consequences. It asks us to consider whether a development in human awareness might carry losses of its own. Treating the garden as a riddle about whether a particular event occurred tends to make that question harder to hear. Treating it as a symbol with a single modern equivalent would narrow it just as quickly. The image of two people hiding retains a range of meaning because the story lets us see them before asking us to decide what they represent.
The same care applies to the word human. I read these writings as testimony to conditions we share, but the testimony comes from particular peoples and traditions. In Exodus, Israel’s bondage and deliverance belong to Israel’s story. A modern reader who recognizes something of their own experience of captivity has made a connection. They have also moved from the world of the text into an application for which they bear responsibility. Calling a difficult departure “my Exodus” might give a person courage. It might also tempt them to assign everyone else a role in their drama, as if the people they are leaving must therefore be Pharaoh. A reading acquires depth when it remains aware of that distance. The story is still able to resist the uses we make of it.
An existential interpretation is a reading to be argued for, with attention to the story’s words and movement. It might bring an aspect of the text into focus while leaving other aspects for a different inquiry. I learned in seminary how much interpretive work goes into making a reading seem obvious. I would rather show my work, including where my reading depends on a choice about what to foreground. That gives a reader something to examine and disagree with. It also lets the passage surprise us when it strains the terms we brought to it.
Genesis opens with God creating the world. This series also asks how human beings came to create God and religion. I mean something specific by create. Human beings give the divine a voice, a character, and a relation to events. They tell a story in which God remembers, grieves, makes a promise, or takes sides. They learn to address this God in a certain way and to recognize certain acts as signs of divine favor. Eventually a child enters a world in which these meanings are already available and some have acquired the authority of facts.
A believer might understand these human acts as responses to a reality that precedes them. An atheist might understand them as the work of the religious imagination. Both still have to reckon with the human labor involved in making a divine presence recognizable and giving it a place in shared life. That labor is visible in the differences between biblical portrayals of God and in the distance between a text and what later readers have asked it to authorize. The metaphysical question remains open in this series. The interpretive question is before us whenever we read a passage in which someone claims to know what God wants.
One of the more demanding questions is what happens when a people’s experience acquires divine significance. To remember that God heard the cries of enslaved people is to make a claim about whose suffering deserves attention. A community that carries such a story has a language for judging conditions it might otherwise take for granted. The Exodus narrative also gives us Egyptian households that grieve. Their presence tests the moral reach of the account. What happens to the suffering of people outside the circle of deliverance when the story of our freedom becomes our account of how divine justice works?
There is a movement from interpreting an experience to building a world in which others will interpret their experiences through it. A memory becomes a practice people repeat. A practice takes on obligations and requires someone to decide how they are kept. The people who exercise that judgment come to have a particular kind of authority. This is part of the making of religion, and its consequences go beyond assent to a set of propositions. Religion organizes time, gives grief a public form, and establishes who is expected to show up when a household needs help. It also establishes who gets heard when an inherited explanation fails to fit a person’s life.
I am interested in that entire movement. The fact that a belief arose in answer to a human need tells us something important about its history. Its truth, moral force, and effects still require judgment. A promise might help someone bear uncertainty and give them a reason to act. The same person might use that promise, in a different circumstance, to avoid recognizing what they have lost. A religious interpretation has a life in the world after its first telling. The series will follow that life where it becomes visible in the text and in the ways people have learned to live with it.
One of the most revealing things about Job’s friends is that they begin well. They sit with him on the ground in silence. After Job speaks, the conversation moves toward the problem his suffering poses for their understanding of a just world. If calamity is evidence of wrongdoing, they have reason to distrust the man they came to comfort. The account by which they make sense of their own lives is preserved at the cost of hearing him. What they gain in coherence, Job loses in the freedom to tell the truth about what has happened to him.
Their position has an appeal worth facing. If upright conduct protects us, we know something about how to keep ourselves and our loved ones safe. Someone else’s undeserved suffering puts that assurance in jeopardy. Blame restores a measure of order and moves the danger away from us. There is a reason this pattern survives changes of religion. We also look for the error that supposedly explains why a person became poor, stayed in a damaging situation, or grieved longer than we expected. Job exposes something about our need for a world we believe we know how to live in.
I use existential health to name the quality of our relationship to existence itself and the capacities through which we inhabit it. One of those capacities is staying in contact with reality when what we encounter puts our account of it under pressure. Another is tolerating enough uncertainty to remain in relationship with someone whose experience we cannot explain. Job also gives us an instance of self-authorship under strain. The man who needs others to sit with him must exercise his own judgment against theirs. His insistence on speaking for himself belongs to the difficulty of remaining a person among people whose regard matters to him.
There is a further question about what counts as health here. A person might be able to go about their day because a familiar explanation keeps an intolerable experience at a distance. From the outside, the arrangement might look like stability. If the explanation requires them to regard their grief as disobedience or their judgment as inherently suspect, that stability has a cost. Conversely, someone who begins to face what a belief allowed them to avoid might go through a period of real disorientation. Existential health takes account of the quality of our contact with life over time. Immediate relief and immediate distress tell us something about what a person is going through. Neither, on its own, tells us what their relationship to what happened is becoming.
I use existential literacy for the work of recognizing what is at stake in an encounter like this. A friend might hear Job’s protest as a crisis of belief and respond by defending the belief. Hearing it as testimony changes what the situation asks of that friend. A person might also recognize that their urge to offer an explanation owes more to their own fear than to anything the bereaved person has said. These are distinctions we learn to make in the course of living. An old text is sometimes precise enough about an encounter to help us notice what we have been doing in a room with someone we love.
When people speak of deconstructing their faith, they often describe a change in what counts as evidence or who has the right to tell them what a passage means. The change goes further when a person starts to notice how an interpretation became part of their sense of themselves. Someone who was taught that questioning expresses rebellion might leave a church and continue to experience the act of asking for reasons as a moral failure. The belief has lost its formal authority while retaining an influence on what the person feels entitled to say.
Reconstruction includes learning to recognize that influence and to exercise judgment in situations where the inherited answer used to arrive first. It also includes giving attention to what people have lost. A ritual might have allowed a family to acknowledge a death together. A community might have given someone the experience of being expected in a room. Those forms of care deserve to be understood in their own right. The work of reconstruction includes deciding what is worth carrying forward, what calls for a different form, and what a person now has good reason to leave behind.
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