A name could enter the Phoenix Program through almost any door. It might appear in a captured document, emerge during the interrogation of a prisoner or be supplied by an informer seeking money, protection or revenge. It could come from the police, the military, a village official or one of the numerous intelligence services operating across South Vietnam. Once recorded, the name became part of a system designed to transform fragments of information into action.
The person behind it might be a senior Communist organizer directing assassinations and collecting taxes for the Viet Cong. He might be a local courier who carried messages because refusal would place his family in danger. She might be a political activist, a frightened villager, the relative of a guerrilla or simply someone unfortunate enough to have acquired an enemy with access to the authorities. The distinction was supposed to be established through intelligence. In practice, intelligence was frequently the accusation itself.
From there, a suspect could be watched, arrested, interrogated, imprisoned or pursued by an armed unit. The evidence might never be tested in an independent court. The identity of an informer might remain secret. Information extracted under torture could be used to implicate further suspects, whose interrogations generated still more names. Every stage gave the appearance of confirming the last.
American and South Vietnamese officials described the desired result with a word almost perfectly engineered to conceal violence: neutralization. A neutralized person might have defected. He might have been detained or sentenced. He might also have been shot during a raid, killed in a military operation or deliberately eliminated by men sent to find him. These very different outcomes were placed within the same statistical category, allowing imprisonment, surrender and death to become interchangeable measurements of administrative progress.
The Phoenix Program was publicly defended as an intelligence-coordination effort intended to dismantle the Viet Cong’s clandestine political organization. Its architects denied that it was an assassination program. They insisted that suspects were more useful alive than dead, that capture was preferred and that abuses were contrary to official policy. Yet the structure built by the United States and the government of South Vietnam brought together blacklists, secret evidence, paramilitary forces, interrogation centers and administrative detention. It operated in a country saturated with corruption, personal vendettas, political repression and institutional violence.
Between 1968 and May 1971, official Phoenix statistics recorded 20,587 suspected members of the Viet Cong Infrastructure as killed. The figure did not mean that Phoenix assassination teams had personally executed every one of them. Many died during conventional military operations and were subsequently classified as members of the underground organization. That qualification matters, but it does not make the number less disturbing. It raises a different question: how many of the dead were identified accurately, and how many became important Communist operatives only after they could no longer dispute the label?
Phoenix’s criminality cannot be understood by searching for a single document ordering the murder of thousands of civilians. No such document was necessary. The program’s deeper offense was institutional. It created a process in which an accusation could become an intelligence file, the file could become a target and the target could become a prisoner or corpse without ever passing through anything resembling a fair judicial system.
The individual torturer, corrupt policeman or trigger-happy paramilitary was only the final instrument. Behind him stood the officials who designed the targeting procedures, supplied the money, constructed the interrogation centers, trained the security services, maintained the records, measured results and then insisted that the violence belonged to someone else.
