ODESA—Ukraine spent the summer taking the war deeper into Russia, and for a while the general mood in Ukraine as well as in Western capitals was that Moscow was finally losing its grip. Refineries burned, warehouses came under attack, and Russian ships found little safety in the Black Sea. Each successful operation encouraged the hope that Ukraine could force the Kremlin into an increasingly expensive retreat.
Autumn has brought a sobering correction to that optimism. Russia is attacking the foundations of life behind the front, trying to make Ukraine too difficult to live in, too expensive to sustain, and too exhausted to continue fighting.
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As summer progressed, it seemed like too many of Ukraine’s supporters, from Kyiv residents to European decision makers, allowed the satisfaction of watching Russian warehouses and refineries burn to
soften their sense of urgency.
The strikes on Kyiv’s bridges, Odesa’s ports, the railways, the border crossings, and of course the power plants and related infrastructure belong to that wider effort. Moscow can inflict enormous damage without capturing another major city. It can obstruct trade, make travel dangerous, and destroy the infrastructure families will depend on when temperatures fall. Ukraine’s summer achievements remain substantial. But Russia has spent those same months finding ways to make Ukrainians pay for them. Uncomfortable questions raise their head: Did we get complacent? Did we make it too easy for Russia?
As summer progressed, it seemed like too many of Ukraine’s supporters, from Kyiv residents to European decision makers, allowed the satisfaction of watching Russian warehouses and refineries burn to soften their sense of urgency. But instead of encouraging everyone to find a comfortable place on the laurel wreath to sleep on, Ukraine’s summer success should have encouraged governments to commit more money and industry to expand faster. However, Ukrainian ingenuity became a convenient reason to believe that the next breakthrough would arrive without much more being required of anyone else. Now, we are entering winter with the consequences of that complacency, and overcoming them will demand a far greater commitment than the one that brought us here.
The strikes have also helped Moscow regain the initiative in the information war. During the summer, burning Russian refineries and successful Ukrainian operations forced the Kremlin to explain its vulnerabilities. Now the coverage increasingly follows the damage in Ukraine and the hardship expected this winter. Russia can use that attention to revive its argument that resistance is futile and Western support merely prolongs the suffering. Moscow is again making its capacity for destruction dominate the discussion. Denying it that advantage will require visible results from stronger defenses and sustained support, alongside continued pressure on Russia.
The situation is strikingly similar to the one of last summer. When Operation Spiderweb struck Russian strategic bombers in June 2025, the admiration was deserved. Ukrainian intelligence had accomplished something extraordinary against aircraft used to bombard the country. Then came fall and winter however, and Ukraine was only barely hanging on through the bitter cold and dark nights shaped by power outages.
After Ukraine’s successful summer, under the “no rules anymore” approach attributed to Putin by Zelenskyy, Russia is striking everywhere it can. Its drones killed two civilians at the Starokozache crossing with Moldova on September 9. Attacks damaged Vynohradivka–Vulcănești, destroyed infrastructure at Tabaky–Myrne, and hit trucks at Reni–Giurgiulești. The Orlivka ferry crossing to Romania was struck again just days after reopening. On September 13, a drone hit the locomotive of a Kyiv–Warsaw passenger train near Poland.
