Compiled by Athena Smith.
Articles
Chemical Security Is National Security
Gregory D. Koblentz argued that the U.S.’s failure to pay the full amount it owes this year to the Chemical Weapons Convention could jeopardize programs to halt the use of chemical weapons around the world. Koblentz stated that the U.S. should deliver its full contribution immediately and outlined how the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons cannot continue to destroy weapons in Syria or defend Ukraine against Russia’s use of toxic chemicals without its regular budget.
The OPCW’s financial crisis threatens the ability of the organization to pursue its vital mission of preventing the proliferation and use of chemical weapons around the world. In addition to endangering current operations overseeing the destruction of chemical weapons in Syria, the OPCW’s assistance to Ukraine to defend it against Russia’s use of toxic chemicals on the battlefield may have to be curtailed and the agency would be unable to launch new missions such as investigating recent revelations about Sudan’s production and use of chemical weapons.
A Rejoinder to Healey and Snyder: Engaging on Stability
Michael P. Fischerkeller, Emily O. Goldman, and Richard J. Harknett wrote a response to Jay Healey and Jack Snyder’s Sept. 2, 2026 piece, “Persistent Engagement and the Illusion of Cyber Equilibrium,” and argued that Healey and Snyder misrepresented cyber persistence theory as a theory of offense in which a country simply exploits an adversary’s cyber vulnerabilities. The authors noted that Healey and Snyder failed to explain their definition of cyber stability and incorrectly held that cyber behavior is driven by factors outside of the cyber strategic environment.
Overall, the Healey-Snyder essay is dangerously one-sided in its description of CPT as offensive in logic and prescription. That is simply inaccurate, and a full reading of our book, “Cyber Persistence Theory: Redefining National Security in Cyberspace” (2022), and many of our articles substantiate the critical role of securing one’s own networks and digital assets through proactive anticipation of exploitation that, when translated into practice, is primarily defensive in character. Distorting the theory’s logic is dangerous. It undermines accurate communication with allies and adversaries alike that is necessary for stabilizing dynamics to occur. Bottom line: CPT does not prescribe aggressive, offensive, and escalatory cyber behavior.
Can Hungary Derussify Its Electric Power Sector?
Elek Krizsán and Thomas N. Russo outlined how Hungary deepened its dependence on Russian natural gas and nuclear fuel under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and analyzed the feasibility of plans under current Prime Minister Péter Magyar’s Tisza Party to diversify its energy sources. Krizsán and Russo maintained that Hungary has fallen into import dependence due to both a lack of natural resources and by political choice, and the new government needs to balance derussification, diversification, and decarbonization.
Hungary can derussify, diversify, and decarbonize its power sector at once, but only by treating nuclear power, not gas, as the keystone of its Russian dependence: By correctly sequencing nuclear fuel supply diversification, gas sourcing, and domestic low-carbon generation, Hungary can overcome the political incentives that entrenched that dependence.
Podcasts
Lawfare Daily: The Trials of the Trump Administration, October 23:Benjamin Wittes sat down with Anna Bower, Eric Columbus, Roger Parloff, Molly Roberts, and Loren Voss to discuss developments in the litigation over the Trump administration’s plan for the East Potomac Park and Arch, the 9th Circuit ruling that President Trump exceeded his authority in the deployment of the National Guard in L.A., legal challenges to the Trump administration’s various actions surrounding the election, and more.
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